The immediate fall-out from a Greek default should be manageable and much less damaging than that which followed the collapse of Lehmans, even if it does count as a “credit event”. However, this assumes that policy-makers are able to prevent contagion to other, much larger borrowers, such as Italy. What’s more, even an “orderly” Greek default would create risks further down the line. If Greece can somehow restructure its debts fairly painlessly, other countries may well be tempted to follow.
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